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Abstract
In “Challenging Freedom: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democratic Education,” the author suggests that the presumed decline of democratic learning in public schooling follows from two primary
forces: (a) the metaphysical implications of Cartesian psychophysical dualism that support an ontological understanding of the self as distinct from social influence and (b) a corresponding concept of
freedom emerging from this ontology that exonerates individuals from any meaningful level of social
moral responsibility. Although we agree in large part with the general argument advanced in the essay,
there are some theoretical and historical gaps that we attempt to bridge in this response. We initially
entertain the author’s proposed relationship between Cartesian ontology and the neoliberal conception of freedom. We then consider whether this understanding of freedom is coherent with a political
commitment to democracy. Next, we expand on the article’s discussion of the relationship between
democracy and education by suggesting that public schools since their inception have served primarily as instruments to disseminate capitalist ideology. Finally, we propose several principles of learning
to advance democratic education in schools.
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n “Challenging Freedom: Neoliberalism and the
Erosion of Democratic Education,” the author suggested
that the presumed decline of democratic learning in public
schooling follows from two primary forces: (a) the metaphysical
implications of Cartesian psychophysical dualism that support an
ontological understanding of the self as distinct from social
influence and (b) a corresponding concept of freedom emerging
from this ontology that exonerates individuals from any meaningful level of social moral responsibility.
Although we agree in large part with the general argument
advanced in the essay, there are some theoretical and historical
gaps that we attempt to bridge in this response. We initially
entertain the author’s proposed connection between Cartesian
ontology and the neoliberal conception of freedom and suggest
any actual causal relationship is probably overstated. We then
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consider whether the neoliberal understanding of freedom
identified by the author is consistent with a political commitment
to democracy. The major discussion mostly missing in “Challenging Freedom” requires an exploration of the relationship among
prevailing economic interests, conceptions of freedom, and U.S.
public education. We address that deficit by expanding on the
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paper’s brief discussion of the relationship between democracy
and education and suggest that public schools since their
inception have served primarily as instruments to disseminate
capitalist ideology. Finally, in our concluding remarks, we
propose several fundamental principles of learning to advance
actual democratic education in U.S. schools.

Conceptions of Freedom and
Democratic Responsibility
There is probably no other philosopher in the history of Western
thought who has endured more criticism for virtually every
contemporary political and practical problem than 17th-century
philosopher Renés Déscartes. It is small surprise, then, that
Déscartes and his infamous quest for epistemic certainty reflected
in cogito ergo sum is blamed for the misguided and antidemocratic
neoliberal conception of freedom identified in “Challenging
Freedom.” Although the author drew an interesting intellectual
connection between psychophysical dualism and neoliberalism,
the actual evidence demonstrating such a relationship is decidedly
scant. For example, it is at least equally probable—and perhaps
more so—that the neoliberal conception of freedom described by
the author follows from the influence of Mill’s (1859) essay On
Liberty and, in particular, his comments on economic freedom.
Mill argued that economies function best when left to their own
devices, and government intervention in the economic affairs of
society is counterproductive and despotic (p. 131).
Whether Déscartes actually contributed to the idea that
freedom includes a complete absence of social responsibility is
mostly postulation and, we contend, perhaps even irrelevant to the
actual issue under examination. The more salient question raised
by “Challenging Freedom” is whether the neoliberal conception of
freedom can be morally or coherently sustained within a democratic political context. We elaborate on this issue by considering
Berlin’s (1969) seminal essay on the relationship among freedom,
ethics, and political structure: “Two Concepts of Liberty.”
From Berlin’s (1969) perspective, there is no sustainable
distinction between political theory and moral theory since the
former merely extends individual values into the social realm, and,
therefore, “political theory is a branch of moral philosophy” (p. 2).
His analysis supported the relationship between the individual
freedom cited by Mill (1859) in On Liberty and the wider social
freedom protected by democracy as a political system. In his essay,
however, Berlin also grappled with the tension sometimes created
when the exercise of individual freedoms clashes with the exercise
of freedoms and rights of other citizens.
The issue of coercion rests at the center of Berlin’s (1969)
analysis of freedom since an individual cannot be free to act and
forced into acting at the same time. Berlin described the problem
this way:
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply
the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to
that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond
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a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be
enslaved. (p. 4)

Suffice to say, the almost blanket rejection of social interference is
the foundational tenet in the conception of freedom adopted by
neoliberal advocates and largely represented in “Challenging
Freedom” through the ideas of Hayek. His general position was
that government interference in the economy leads to a form of
totalitarianism by constraining free market exchange.
Alternatively, Berlin drew our attention to the considerable moral
problems provoked by such an absolute understanding of freedom
within a democracy. As he put it:
What troubles the conscience of Western liberals is not that the
freedom that men seek differs according to their social or economic
conditions, but that the minority who possess it have gained it by
exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from, the vast majority who
do not. (p. 4)

Philosophically speaking, freedom, although widely considered a moral good, has seldom been praised in an absolute sense
devoid of any social responsibility. One of the more radical
conceptions of freedom is found within Rousseau’s (1984) political
philosophy, one that arguably influenced both the French and the
American Revolutions, where his aim was designing social and
political institutions to ensure “each [citizen], uniting with all,
nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as free as before”
(p. 24). An agent’s freedom to act in both Kantian deontology and
Mill’s (1859) utilitarianism is ethically mitigated by more significant consideration of its potential impact on others. The categorical imperative demands that moral agents universalize their
individual choices or actions to consider their ethical impact on
society (Kant, 2012). Mill’s utilitarianism, consistent with consequentialist ethics, similarly demands that we consider the broader
effects of our behavior. Indeed, utilitarianism posits that the
purpose of morality, and by extension political structure, is to
increase the amount of pleasure and happiness in the world while
decreasing the amount of pain and unhappiness (Mill, 2007).
In Existentialism and Human Emotion, Sartre (1987), the same
philosopher who proclaimed that humans are absolutely free,
advocated for an existentialist ethic that entails a profound social
responsibility to pursue freedom in a manner where the freedom of
other persons is unimpeded by individual actions: “And when we
say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that
he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (p. 15). Sartre contended that valuing other
people’s freedom in addition to appreciating our own is necessary
to maintain logical consistency. We cannot avoid recognizing that
we are inherently free, and, therefore, we choose freedom, and any
decision to devalue the freedom of others undermines the choice
of freedom as a universal ethical good.
Since the value of freedom according to existentialism is
self-evident to anyone who carefully considers the nature of ethical
action, it would be incoherent for individuals to act in a way that
undermines freedom’s universal moral value. In other words, the
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attempt to deny freedom to others is unsustainable because it
undermines the universal moral value of individual freedom. In a
fashion that reflects this same ethical responsibility to others,
Berlin (1969) argued that “if the liberty of myself or my class or
nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings,
the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral” (Sartre,
1987, p. 5). As a mode of production that thrives on the exploitative
appropriation and distribution of significant surplus labor to secure
its conditions of existence (Resnick & Wolff, 1987), neoliberal
capitalism is arguably such an unjust and immoral system.
A nonegalitarian economic system such as neoliberalism
more probably reflects a misguided form of neo-Hobbesian
absolutism that protects sovereign, or in this case hegemonic
aristocratic, power while demonstrating callous disregard for
human dignity by elevating the concept of freedom without regard
for equity. Contemporary supporters of this “social contract”
philosophy include Canadian American philosopher Gauthier
(1986):
The rich man may feast on caviar and champagne, while the poor
woman starves at his gate. And she may not even take the crumbs
from his table, if that would deprive him of his pleasure in feeding
them to his birds. (p. 218)

In the words of welfare economics expert and Nobel Prize recipient
Sen (1992), the neoliberal strategy is about “justifying inequality
through equality” (p. 21). Although neoliberals demand individual
freedom for all citizens, the actual freedom to act rests predominantly in the hands of the economic elite.
The author of “Challenging Freedom” convincingly demonstrated that the success of the neoliberal conception of freedom
owes much to its consistency with core assumptions about the
modern liberal identity—namely, the chasm between nature and
self and the supposedly subjective source of knowledge and moral
judgments. However, failing to locate this discussion within the
ideological limits of capitalist rationality undercuts the author’s
critique of the neoliberal understanding of freedom and the moral
relationship between individuals and a democratic society.
The author of “Challenging Freedom” was correct in so far as
neoliberals such as Friedman (1962) exploit a crude understanding
of freedom—Friedman defined freedom as the “absence of coercion
of a man by his fellow man” (p. 14)—that enables those with power
and position to act in an unfettered individual fashion to the
detriment of society. This definition of freedom creates a situation
where the dominant understanding of and commitment to
“freedom” eliminates any hint of democratic education that focuses
on community welfare or progressive social reform. Indeed, the
self-interested—if not entirely selfish—political ethics following
from this perspective threatens not only democratic learning in
public education but also democratic commitment to equal
opportunity. We must confront the important moral problem,
then, of striking a balance between the democratic freedom to act
without coercion and the democratic moral responsibility to
respect the rights, freedoms, and opportunities of others. As Berlin
(1969) correctly observed about any democratic context respecting
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the fundamental principles of social justice, “We cannot remain
absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the
rest” (p. 5).
As a discursive ploy, the concept of freedom is frequently
used as an ideological device by neoliberals to provoke public
opinion against government intervention in economic and social
matters, but its actual relationship to democracy is largely
assumed rather than demonstrated. In fact, the understanding of
freedom reflected in neoliberal discourse is not connected to
democratic societies in any other than rhetorical fashion. There is
nothing in the concept of political democracy that supports a
concept of freedom entirely removed from social responsibility.
Indeed, it is perfectly conceivable that other forms of government, such as a dictatorship or anarchy, might permit individuals
to act in such an unrestrained or unregulated manner. Berlin
(1969) suggested that “freedom on this sense is not, at any rate
logically, connected with democracy or self-government” (p. 6).
In “The Ethics of Democracy,” Dewey argued that the relationship
between the individual and society is highly interdependent.
Individual citizens have an interest in society, just as society has
an interest in them. The condition and circumstances of one citizen
inevitably affect the conditions and circumstances of others.
The individual cannot act democratically without significant
consideration of how such action impacts on society as a whole
(Micheletti, 2011).

Public Schools and Democratic Education
When referring to how the history of public schooling in the
United States has been rife historically with contestation and
conflict over schooling goals, values, and beliefs, the author of
“Challenging Freedom” rightly, albeit briefly, contended that “it is
debatable whether United States public education ever held a
central role for its civic purposes” (p. 3). In our view, the lack of
attention afforded to meaningful democratic learning in U.S.
schools is a demonstrable reality of domestic public education.
Neo-Marxist Althusser (1971) offered a poignant analysis of public
school development in which he suggested the expanding suffrage
of Western democracies after the 19th century prompted the
aristocratic hegemony to pursue greater mechanisms of ideological
control over public consciousness through education.
Until the 19th century, when its political power began to wane
in the face of a rising bourgeoisie class, the Church had largely
dominated control over public consciousness. Within England’s
fledgling 19th-century democracy, formal electoral political
participation was restricted to “gentlemen” who possessed sufficient economic standing measured by sufficient property ownership. With the rise of the bourgeoisie class, and the class disruption
previously provoked by the French and American Revolutions,
other groups began demanding increased political participation in
the formal electoral process. As Althusser (1971) correctly posited,
it was during this push toward universal suffrage that the development of public schooling gained considerable momentum. Public
schooling, with its broad social influence, afforded the aristocracy a
more modern vehicle to “wrap students in ruling ideology” (p. 134),
thereby shielding the prevailing economic order from fundamental
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structural change. Following from Althusser’s analysis, then, the
examination of contemporary democratic education pursued in
“Challenging Freedom” should have included some consideration
of historically constituted social and power relations and their
relationship to U.S. public education. The analysis of neoliberalism’s impact on democratic education we provide below is framed
within the ideological parameters of social regulation and the
normalizing of people through curriculum (Popkewitz, 2015).
During the early 20th century, the social purpose of schools
was a hotly contested topic in the United States. Dewey, a champion of democratic progress, and Snedden, a social efficiency
proponent, debated the role of public education. Similar to current
neoliberal ideologues, Snedden viewed social stratification as an
inevitable outcome of individual capacity and, correspondingly,
condemned any attempt to overcome the assumed natural order.
Snedden held as an axiom that most students, a group he postulated at 80%, would only benefit from a schooling experience that
prepared them directly for work (Drost, 1967). He argued that the
only acceptable education was one that prepared most students for
immediate occupational placement within the existing industrial
structure.
Reflecting his Hegelian-based confidence in individual and
social progress, Dewey (1916) was a trenchant critic of Snedden’s
social-efficiency framework, the latter having interestingly gained
widespread popularity among both industry leaders and labor
associations. Dewey warned that such an education—and this
warning is perhaps even more salient within neoliberal culture—
merely validated class stratification by perpetuating an educational
philosophy of social predestination:
Any scheme of vocational education, which takes as its point of
departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to
assume and perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses, and thus become
an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social
predestination. (p. 318)

Dewey rejected the idea of students as passive objects subject to the
whims of market economy forces. In his view, students as future
democratic citizens were constructors of knowledge, living and
working in a world of dynamic social beings with the existential
capacity to shape and transform their social, political, and economic experiences (Hyslop-Margison, 2000).
The current ideological onslaught confronting U.S. public
schools has increasingly permeated the secondary education
sector. The massive return of soldiers after World War II, followed
by the force and scope of the U.S. civil rights movement, gave rise
to an unprecedented demand for access to higher education. The
same ideological approach to education described by Althusser
(1971) that targeted the manipulation of student consciousness was
accordingly applied to higher education. The community college
rapidly gained prominence as the educational alternative to
universities for millions of American students. In fact, and despite
the hyperinflated discursive rhetoric of accessibility and democracy, the community college effectively functioned as “midwife for
humbler expectations” (Brint, 2003, p. 32), and a relentless class
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struggle to “vocationalize” junior colleges was instigated (Ramírez,
2006). The tiered vocational education envisioned and defended
by Snedden began to effectively track mass numbers of those who
are in the cultural and linguistic minority into two-year colleges,
effectively shielding elite institutions and their privileged students
from the education-for-work approach. In their 1976 groundbreaking book, Schooling in Capitalist America, Bowles and Gintis
quoted sociologist Etzioni of Columbia University: “If we can no
longer keep the floodgates closed at the admissions office, it at least
seems wise to channel the general flow away from four-year
colleges and toward two-year extensions of high school in the
junior and community colleges” (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p. 203).
The current overrepresentation of those who are in the
minority in community colleges and their underrepresentation in
four-year universities (akin to overrepresentation in remedial
education and underrepresentation in gifted programs within
public schools) indicates the success of this strategy. Equally
indicative is the low rate of students who currently transfer from
community college and earn a degree in a four-year institution
(16.2%) but do so in a period of six years (Shapiro, Dundar, Yuan,
Harrell, & Wakhungu, 2014). Every year, the overwhelming
enrollment of Hispanics in two-year colleges and their low transfer
rate prompts numerous applications to federal grants by institutions serving large numbers of Hispanic students, including entire
representative systems such as California State University (Department of Education, 2015). Despite the blatant demographic
disparities evident after analyses of this kind, educational initiatives that pursue massification serve to placate the masses since
they ostensibly receive an education consistent with democratic
principles.
The debate over the best way to educate once again became
prominent in the 1970s, when a cyclical overaccumulation crisis in
capitalism was conveniently reconstructed and recontextualized as
a crisis in education (Ramírez, 2008). The publication and dissemination of the report “A Nation at Risk” epitomizes the convenient
positioning of public education as simultaneously scapegoat
(taking the blame for economic ills) and panacea (as the only route
to lead to economic success). More pointedly, the deflecting of
economic responsibility onto public education serves the ideological objective of insulating the prevailing structural system from
criticism or reform.
Other notable scholars also highlight the ways economic
crises have been historically redirected to education in the interest
of capitalism. For example, Pinar (2011) described the neoliberal
ideological shifting of moral responsibility as follows:
Employing a classic “blame-the-victim” tactic, politicians have insisted
that educators are to blame, and not just for what they judge to be low
test scores. In the 1950s and early 1960s teachers were blamed for
jeopardizing the American military position vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union and, in the early 1980s, for US currency and devaluation. Now
teachers are held “accountable” for America’s economic performance
in the “new millennium,” distracting the public from the unethical and
unprofitable practices of many American businesses . . . As it turns
out, “accountability” is nothing more than a “projection” onto
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educators of that ethical responsibility to the public many businessmen
and politicians themselves so profoundly lack. (p. 182)

The current blame-the-victim rhetoric supported by neoliberal
accountability measures such as the increase in standardization,
quantification, and competition relies on ill-conceived devices of
transparency, through which various forms of school data are made
available to the public. Instead of promoting any meaningful form
of democratic learning or addressing the social structure of
opportunity, public reporting of schools is employed as political
spectacle (Koyama & Kania, 2014); the charade of accountability
reflects the sole intent to legitimize political action to undermine
what neoliberals and their think tanks openly call “the cult of
public education” (Carter, 2001, p. 34).
The contemporary milieu of public education initiated by the
“A Nation at Risk” report gave rise to the standards movement that
later morphed into the standardized assessment movement. All of
these movements provide significant evidence to support the claim
on the escalating ideological role of U.S. schools. In his article “The
Neoliberal Attack on Education,” Giroux (2012) argued that “public
education is under assault . . . the most serious attack is being waged
by advocates of neoliberalism, whose reform efforts focus narrowly
on high-stakes testing, traditional texts and memorization drill”
(p. 1). High-stakes testing decontextualizes public education and
situates responsibility for teaching and learning—read as
accountability—entirely at the micro level of analysis. Administrators, teachers, and students become neoliberal scapegoats for weak
academic achievement, while the social structure of opportunity,
the most important determinant of academic achievement, is
entirely removed from scrutiny. The emphasis on memorization
reported by Giroux also situates students—to employ a Freirean
understanding—as empty vessels into which decontextualized
information is dumped for future retrieval. When students are
habituated into this passive epistemological role, they become easy
future targets for the neoliberal manipulation of their consciousness. They also learn to view themselves as passive objects in society
rather than as transformative agents of structural change.
In spite of the intensifying impact of neoliberal ideology,
public education was never developed historically as a vehicle for
democratic teaching and learning. As mentioned in the reviewed
article and expanded upon in this section of our response, the
contestation among opposing political forces over the purpose of
schools within democratic societies constitutes a long-standing
debate in curriculum discourse. There is considerable force to the
idea advanced by Althusser (1971) that public schools have always
provided the economic elite with a vehicle to control the political
predilections of the masses. The current imposition of neoliberal
market assumptions into education merely extends and deepens
that troubling historical trend.

Conclusion
We enthusiastically agree with the author of “Challenging
Freedom” that contemporary U.S. public schools reflect a worrisome monolithic perspective on education that considers work
preparation the only important learning outcome. This narrow
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 1

preoccupation includes a profound ideological commitment to
situate structural problems in students and schools rather than
within the social structure of opportunity. We also support the idea
that the neoliberal conception of freedom undercuts the role of
education as a vehicle to advance social responsibility and concern
for the welfare of other citizens. However, we are far less convinced
that this superficial understanding of freedom emerges from
Cartesian metaphysics as much as it does from ideological manipulation and a convenient denial of the inevitable interaction between
the individual and an ethical democratic society.
Perhaps the other missing piece within “Challenging
Freedom” is a discussion of what actual democratic learning
might include. Although addressing this subject fully involves a
protracted and comprehensive discussion of pedagogical options,
we conclude this article by sharing three central principles of
democratic learning identified in our previous scholarship:
(a) Democratic teaching respects student rationality by encouraging critique of curriculum content. When students are deprived
of the opportunities to question what they are learning, they
become the passive objects of education rather than participatory
subjects in democratic learning. (b) Democratic teaching
provides students with alternative viewpoints and perspectives on
issues relevant to vocational and social experience. If students are
expected to make informed, critical, democratic choices, they
require exposure to different perspectives on curriculum matters.
(c) Democratic teaching does not depict social and economic
conditions as fixed or predetermined but explicitly recognizes the
legitimate right of students to transform structural experience
through informed political participation (Hyslop‐Margison &
Graham, 2001).
In the final analysis, these pedagogical practices are designed
to promote student understanding that society is a dynamic and
transformable construct rather than a static and inexorable one.
Such an understanding stands not only at the core of democratic
learning within public schools but of any meaningful conception of
what constitutes a democratic society. The type of scholarship
pursued by the author of “Challenging Freedom” contributes
mightily to a broadened understanding on the integral relationship
between public education and democratic society. In that sense, the
article takes an important stride toward fostering wider understanding on the agential role of students in creating a democratic
society where individual action is ethically mitigated by social
responsibility.
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